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WARRANTLESS LOCATION TRACKING
IAN JAMES SAMUEL*
The ubiquity of cell phones has transformed police investigations. Tracking a sus-
pect's movements by following her phone is now a common but largely unnoticed
surveillance technique. It is useful, no doubt, precisely because it is so revealing; it
also raises significant privacy concerns. In this Note, I consider what the proce-
dural requirements for cell phone tracking should be by examining the relevant
statutory and constitutional law. Ultimately, the best standard is probable cause;
only an ordinary warrant can satisfy the text of the statutes and the mandates of the
Constitution.
INTRODUCTION
Technological advances often result in new police investigation
techniques. Some such developments, like heat detection, prove to be
legally significant as well as professionally useful, and find their way
into Supreme Court opinions.1 Others, like forensic crime scene anal-
ysis, simply become routine parts of the ordinary police toolkit. Cell
phones are emerging as an important but little-noticed investigative
tool. In particular, the ability to track a phone's location has proven
incredibly useful to the police, even as the legal status of such tracking
has grown quite murky.
Tracking a suspect's precise movements may shatter a claimed
alibi: In Scott Peterson's murder trial, for example, Peterson's cell
phone records were introduced to establish his whereabouts on the
morning of his wife's murder, belying his version of the events of that
morning.2 Retrospective analysis of cell phone records, however, is
just the beginning. Real-time monitoring is even more powerful.
When a Greek magnate was kidnapped by criminals who often
changed locations to avoid the police, detectives monitored cell phone
* Copyright © 2008 by Ian James Samuel, J.D., 2008, New York University School of
Law. Thanks to Samuel Issacharoff, Barry Friedman, Noah Feldman, Paul Monteleoni,
Antoine McNamara, Benjamin Yaster, and Erik Paulsen for their help, and extraordinary
thanks to Caroline Mello for being a constant source of patience and smart ideas.
1 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding use of thermal
imaging device aimed at private home from public street constitutes "search" within
meaning of Fourth Amendment).
2 Diana Walsh & Stacy Finz, The Peterson Trial; Defendant Lied Often, Recorded Calls
Show; Supporters Misled About Whereabouts, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 26, 2004, at B1, available
at http://www.sfgate.comlcgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a12004/08/26/BAG458EJ3S1.DTL.
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records and were able to locate the victim. 3 The kidnappers' phones
were, in effect, converted into very accurate tracking devices, without
the police needing physical access to them.
This technique isn't limited to investigating high profile cases like
Peterson's or thwarting the kidnapping of foreign dignitaries. Cell
phone tracking is used to solve more mundane crimes, such as car
thefts never reported outside the local papers. 4 It is even available to
private citizens who want to monitor their children or spouses.5
Given the power of this technique, it's no surprise that its use has
become routine.6 A common step in police investigations today is to
secure a court order tracking the movements of a suspect or anyone
else whose location the police believe useful. The flip side of this
powerful tool, though, is how revealing and intrusive it is. Few people
would be comfortable being followed by a police officer all day, even
if they did nothing illegal or even interesting. Justice Brandeis once
invoked the "right to be let alone," 7 and undetectable location
tracking pressures the alone part: No one is "let alone" if the police
may, without notice or probable cause, find out everywhere they go
for a day or a month.
This tension is a familiar one in American criminal law: The use-
fulness of an investigative tool is always roughly proportional to its
intrusiveness. Out of that simple tension grows a major portion of
criminal procedure. Today, the federal district courts have divided on
the proper procedural requirements for cell phone tracking, 8 and no
3 Laurie Thomas Lee, Can Police Track Your Wireless Calls? Call Location Informa-
tion and Privacy Law, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 381, 381 (2003) (discussing kidnap-
ping of Greek magnate).
4 See, e.g., Girl, 5, Found Safe as Man Steals Car, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Colo.), Apr. 22,
2004, at 18A (reporting use of cell phone to locate car stolen with child inside).
5 Many such services are available. For a representative example, consider Accu-
Tracking, which bills itself as the "[t]racking [s]ervice for [e]veryone." AccuTracking,
http://www.accutracking.com (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
6 See In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a
Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. &/or
Cell Site Info. (Orenstein Opinion 11), 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 318 n.21 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(referring to cell phone tracking as "routine" technique for which judicial authorization
requests have been drafted on "forms that have been in use for years").
7 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
193 (1890).
S Compare In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Disclo-
sure of Prospective Cell Site Info. (Adelman Opinion), No. 06-MISC-004, 2006 WL
2871743, at *1, *7 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 6, 2006) (requiring probable cause and warrant for such
tracking), and In re Application of the United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing the
Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device; (2) Authorizing the Release
of Subscriber & Other Info.; & (3) Authorizing the Disclosure of Location-Based Servs.
(Lee Opinion), Nos. 1:06-MC-6, 1:06-MC-7, 2006 WL 1876847, at *1, *5 (N.D. Ind. July 5,
2006) (same), with In re Application of the United States for an Order for Prospective Cell
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court of appeals has yet addressed the issue. The magistrate judges
who actually issue the orders have been similarly divided.9
This Note argues that before police may track a cell phone, they
ought to be required to obtain an ordinary warrant founded on prob-
able cause. After a brief explanation of the technical and legal
mechanics of tracking in Part I, I turn to the relevant statutory law in
Part II. All of the court decisions in this area thus far have relied
exclusively on the electronic surveillance statutes.
The deep disagreement about the meaning of those statutes, how-
ever, makes it worthwhile to analyze what the Constitution has to say
about the matter. In Part III, I argue that warrantless location
tracking raises serious and difficult questions of constitutional law.
For that reason, I invoke the statutory canon of "constitutional doubt"
and argue that the ambiguous statutes should be read in a way that
will not require those difficult constitutional questions to be con-
fronted. Because the doubts are grounded in the Fourth Amendment,
the easiest way to avoid these hard questions is to read the statutes to
require a warrant, founded on probable cause, to track a person's cell
phone. In making this move, I part company with other judges and
commentators who have written on the topic and who generally have
focused entirely on the simple "yes/no" question of constitutionality
or statutory legality, without much consideration of how the two
interact.
Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel. (Kaplan Opinion), 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (permitting such searches absent probable cause), and In re Application
of the United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen
Register & Trap & Trace Device, & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber & Other Info.
(Rosenthal Opinion), 433 F. Supp. 2d 804, 805-06 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (same).
9 A complete list of published magistrate opinions on this topic would exhaust the
space available for discussion of them; only a representative few need be considered. See,
e.g., In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing (1) Installation & Use
of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device or Process, (2) Access to Customer Records, &
(3) Cell Phone Tracking (Smith Opinion), 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 836-37 (S.D. Tex. 2006)
(concluding that less than probable cause showing for cell phone location tracking might
violate Fourth Amendment); In re Application of the United States for an Order for Dis-
closure of Telecomms. Records & Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace
(Gorenstein Opinion), 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 448-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (allowing such tracking
without probable cause); Orenstein Opinion 11, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 295, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(requiring probable cause and warrant for such tracking); In re Application of the United
States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device &
(2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. &/or Cell Site Info. 384 F. Supp. 2d 562, 564
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (same, but on different grounds). For an overview of the case law avail-
able on cell phone location tracking, see Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Allowable Use
of Federal Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device to Trace Cell Phones and Internet Use,
15 A.L.R. FED. 2D 537, 547-61 (2007) (collecting published cases).
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I
How CELL PHONE TRACKING WORKS
The technical details of cell phone tracking are not too complex,
and are worth understanding to have a good grasp of the issue. This
Part describes those details, gives a brief overview of the legal process
currently used to secure the tracking orders, and describes how the
issue was first considered by magistrate judges.
A cell phone is "a radio-an extremely sophisticated radio, but a
radio nonetheless." 10 To send and receive calls, text messages, or e-
mail, cell phones communicate with radio towers, known as cell
towers.11 The cell towers are distributed throughout a coverage area;
cell phone users are often in range of more than one.12
The quality of the signal to and from these towers is what's mea-
sured by the characteristic "bars" on cell phones. As users of cell
phones know, the signal quality bars are present whether or not a call
is in progress, as the phones remain in regular contact with nearby cell
towers.' 3 By comparing the phone signal's time and angle of arrival at
several cell towers, the location of the broadcast can be figured out.14
This is known as radio triangulation. 15 The more densely placed the
phone towers, the more accurate the location data will be. This loca-
tion information, originating as it does from the physical cell towers, is
often called "cell site information. 1 16 The upshot is that "[i]t is now
possible to locate a person using a cellular phone down to a range of a
few meters, anywhere on the globe."'1 7
The technical possibility of tracking cell phone location, by itself,
would not be much of an investigative tool. The owners of the cell
towers (usually phone companies), not the police, possess the relevant
10 Julia Layton et al., How Cell Phones Work, How STUFF WORKS, http://elec-
tronics.howstuffworks.com/cell-phone.htm/printable (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 See Kaplan Opinion, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 450 (describing every cell phone as "periodi-
cally transmit[ting] a unique identification number to register its presence and location in
the network").
14 For example, Apple's iPhone relies in part on this technique to show its user her
location on the map software. See John Markoff, Jobs Returns to His Mac Roots with a
Thin, Ultralight Laptop, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2008, at C4 (discussing map feature's intro-
duction at 2008 Macworld Expo).
15 Kaplan Opinion, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 451 & n.3; see also JOHN CLAYTON TRACY,
PLANE SURVEYING: A TEXT-BOOK AND POCKET MANUAL 191-200 (1906) (describing tri-
angulation in another context).
16 See, e.g., Kaplan Opinion, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 451 (referring to location information as
"cell site" data).
17 Marshall Brain & Jeff Tyson, How Buying a Cell Phone Works, How STuFF WORKS,
http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/cell-phone-buying6.htm (last accessed Mar. 8, 2008).
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information. To get the location data, police need a legal mechanism
to compel its disclosure. The Pen Register Act provides this mecha-
nism.18 It allows police to apply for a "pen register," which initially
referred to a mechanical device designed to record numbers dialed. 19
Today, a pen register is defined much more broadly.20 If the statutory
requirements are fulfilled,21 a judge orders the phone company to dis-
close the information. 22
When new technology emerges, the first applications of the law
try to build on old paradigms, generally without contemplating
whether the new tools challenge the implicit assumptions of the past.
So it was during most of this particular tracking technique's history;
police tracking requests were approved wholly without comment by
the magistrate judges who actually issued the orders.23 Justice
Department attorneys assured the magistrates of the legality of their
requests, and the magistrates acquiesced without opinion.24 The
failure to issue any opinions on this topic has many possible explana-
tions, but the simplest is probably right: Most likely, the magistrate
judges trusted the claims of U.S. Attorneys about what the law
required on this subject, and since these proceedings are ex parte, no
one else pressed the issue.
Judge Orenstein upset the apple cart in an August 2005 opinion
that admitted to granting many of these orders in the past,25 but simul-
taneously concluded that such orders were illegal without probable
cause. 26 It was the first opinion to raise the issue, and it came as an
enormous shock to the lawyers involved who had come to regard such
18 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2000).
19 United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977).
20 See In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a
Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. &/or
Cell Site Info. (Orenstein Opinion II), 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 318 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting
Patriot Act's expansion of pen/trap definitions).
21 These requirements are set out generally in 18 U.S.C. § 3123(b) (2000). What
exactly the statutory requirements are for this type of pen register-particularly, what evi-
dentiary showing must be made-is the topic of this Note.
22 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2000).
23 See In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a
Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. &/or
Cell Site Info. (Orenstein Opinion 1), 384 F. Supp. 2d 562, 566 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (describing
absence of law on topic despite magistrates in other jurisdictions confronting issue).
24 Id.
25 Id. (citing Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not
to reject it merely because it comes late.")).
26 Id. at 564 (cell site data "is not information that the government may lawfully obtain
absent a showing of probable cause").
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requests as routine. 27 The opinion touched off a minor firestorm
within the broader community of American magistrate judges. Very
soon after Judge Orenstein's initial opinion, Judge Smith of the
Southern District of Texas issued an opinion on the topic, grounded in
different reasons but reaching the same conclusion.28 Judge Orenstein
then issued a much longer opinion on a motion for reconsideration,
citing Judge Smith extensively.29 Other magistrates soon followed
suit.30
It looked for a moment as if the issue was going to be settled by
consensus, but that was not to be. Magistrate judges soon published
opinions reaching the opposite conclusion and affirming the legality of
these orders, the first of whom was Judge Gorenstein of the Southern
District of New York.31 Other judges followed Judge Gorenstein's
lead, and it rapidly became clear that appellate resolution of this issue
was unlikely, since the Department of Justice (DOJ) has not sought
district court review in most cases, and has never sought appellate
court review. 32 When the DOJ loses, the matter ends; when the DOJ
wins, there is no one else in court to appeal.
As a result, there is a live statutory disagreement amongst judges
regarding an enormously important tool used in police investigations,
a disagreement whose contours cannot even be fully mapped by a
close study of the published opinions. It's likely that some judges
continue to issue these orders without comment, either because they
are unaware of the disagreement regarding their legality or because,
27 Cf In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a
Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. &/or
Cell Site Info. (Orenstein Opinion 11), 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 318 n.21 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(referring to this technique as "routine," and having been submitted on "forms that have
been in use for years").
28 See In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing (1) Installation
& Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device or Process, (2) Access to Customer
Records, & (3) Cell Phone Tracking (Smith Opinion), 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 836-37 (S.D.
Tex. 2006).
29 See Orenstein Opinion H, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 294.
30 See supra note 8.
31 In re Application of the United States for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomms.
Records & Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace (Gorenstein Opinion),
405 F. Supp. 2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). This prompted amicus curiae the Electronic Frontier
Foundation to remark on its website: "What a difference a G makes." Electronic Frontier
Foundation: DeepLinks, Bad Ruling on Cell Phone Tracking, http://www.eff.org/deep-
links/2005/12/bad-ruling-cell-phone-tracking-what-difference-g-makes (last visited Mar. 8,
2008).
32 The magistrate judges have encouraged the government to seek review by a court of
appeals. See, e.g., In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the
Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber
Info. &/or Cell Site Info. (Orenstein Opinion 1), 384 F. Supp. 2d 562, 566 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(requesting appellate resolution of matter).
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after considering the arguments on all sides, they understand the stat-
utes to come down on one side or the other.
The open legal question concerns the evidentiary standard that
must be met to justify using a pen register to track a phone's location
rather than just record dialed numbers. Whether the police must
show probable cause, something less, or perhaps even something
more, is the debate to which I now turn.
II
STATUTORY DISAGREEMENT
Despite its enormous value to the police, evident ubiquity, and
the potential consequences for individual privacy, the legality of cell
phone tracking was not addressed in a published opinion until 2005. 33
The courts that have addressed this issue since have focused on the
electronic surveillance statutes, which is where this Part begins. These
statutes are strangely written, however, and ambiguous about the key
question: what law enforcement must show to a neutral magistrate to
track a person's location using her cell phone. This Part argues that
the ambiguity cannot be resolved by reference to the text alone. In
Part III, the ambiguity will be resolved by resort to other means.
A. The Content/Envelope Distinction
The statutory disagreement centers on only a few statutory provi-
sions, the text of which will be explored shortly. First, however, it is
helpful to understand why pen registers are treated differently from
wiretaps, a difference in treatment that runs through all of the statu-
tory and constitutional law on this topic.
The level of process required for different types of surveillance
falls along a continuum.34 At one end is a total absence of any legal
process requirements-the police can get certain information without
any process or order from a judge. (Consider, for example, the infor-
mation an officer learns by simply walking around the local neighbor-
hood.) At the other end is the "super-warrant" of Title 111, 35 the
federal wiretap statute, which requires probable cause, restricts who
may request a wiretap, and requires that alternatives to wiretaps be
unsuccessfully tried or too dangerous to attempt. 36 In between are
33 See id. (stating that Judge Orenstein's research "failed to reveal any federal case law
directly on point").
34 On the continuum of surveillance process, see Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance
Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 607, 620-21
(2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=317501.
35 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
36 § 2518.
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several intermediate levels of process commonly found in surveillance
law, as illustrated in the chart below. 37
Evidentiary Requirement Example
Burden
Nothing Nothing. Walking the Beat
Relevance Certify to judge that the information is Pen Register 3 8
"relevant."
Articulable Facts Offer specific facts that give reasonable Stored Communications
3 9
grounds to believe information is relevant
and material.
Probable Cause Show likelihood that evidence of a crime Search of a Home 4 0
will be revealed in the location to be
searched.
Super-Warrant Show probable cause and comply with Wiretap
4 1
other procedures.
Where a surveillance technique falls on this spectrum often
depends on what kind of information it discloses. Every communica-
tions network "features two types of information: the contents of
communications, and the addressing and routing information that the
networks use to deliver the contents of communications. '42 The
former is "content information," and tends to be associated with high
procedural requirements. The latter is "envelope information," and
tends to be associated with the opposite. 43
The federal wiretap statute,44 for example, concerns itself explic-
itly with endeavors to "intercept ... any wire, oral, or electronic com-
munication, '45 and prohibits the use of those communications as
evidence except as the statute provides.46 The statute defines "inter-
cept" as "acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral
communication, '47 and "contents" as "any information concerning the
substance, purport, or meaning of that communication. '48 The super-
warrant requirement is triggered by a wiretap's interception of
content. 49
37 This chart owes much to Kerr, supra note 33, at 620-21.
38 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a).
39 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
40 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1).
41 18 U.S.C. § 2518.
42 Kerr, supra note 33, at 611.
43 Id.
44 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
45 § 2511(1)(a).
46 § 2515.
47 § 2510(4).
48 § 2510(8).
49 § 2518 (describing super-warrant requirements for intercepting wire, oral, and elec-
tronic communications).
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By contrast, an ordinary pen register discloses nothing about a
phone call other than that it occurred and what the phone numbers
involved were. A pen register is defined as "a device which records or
decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers
dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such
device is attached. ' 50 This is envelope information, and is governed
by low procedural requirements.5 1
What makes location tracking interesting is that it does not fit
neatly along the spectrum between interception of content and
envelope information. In a literal sense, the location of a call is "sig-
naling information," and might properly be regarded as "envelope
information." After all, an objector might state, doesn't the post
office stamp the time and location on envelopes when letters are
mailed?52 And didn't the "classic" pen register, which recorded only
phone numbers, disclose the location of the call-the house to which
the phone line was attached? Yes.
The exact details of one's movements, however, seem intuitively
more revealing than the zip code on a birthday card. Location
tracking of one's cell phone can, for example, reveal visits to places
one might wish to keep private: the local gay bar, the abortion clinic
in the next city over, or union headquarters. By contrast, the post
office's envelope information reveals only a visit to the post office.
What is essential is not whether the information is "content" or
"envelope," but rather what the information reveals; the old "content/
envelope" line is probative on that question, but not determinative.
Bolstering this conclusion are statutes, discussed below, that explicitly
place limits (albeit unclear in their substance) on pen registers that
might disclose location information.
It's worth analyzing the statutes with a clear understanding that
the "content/envelope" distinction upon which they rely doesn't trans-
late easily to this new era. There's no reason that we should anticipate
finding all information easily divided into "content" and "envelope";
our data is no longer wrapped in paper and transmitted by Pony
Express. It's natural to expect that the old assumptions about how
information is packaged will fall away as technology advances.
50 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2000).
51 See 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (requiring law enforcement to certify that pen register infor-
mation "likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing crim-
inal investigation").
52 I am grateful to Professor Kerr for raising this objection.
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B. The Ambiguous Statutory Text
Against that background, let's consider the statutory provisions at
the core of the dispute. The question is not "whether the government
can obtain cell site information," but rather what "standard it must
meet before a court will authorize such disclosure. ' 53 The Pen
Register Act sets out a legal process for obtaining pen register
orders,54 which include cell phone tracking orders.5 5 A separate
statute, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
(CALEA), says that no order issued "solely pursuant" to the Pen
Register Act may disclose the physical location of the subscriber.56
This places a limit on the use of the Pen Register Act to track cell
phones, certainly. The statutory disagreement is: If location informa-
tion cannot be gotten "solely pursuant" to the Pen Register Act, what
combination of statutory authority is acceptable? That is, the Pen
Register Act plus what other law equals authority to track cell
phones?
This is a very odd question of statutory interpretation. Statutes
do not often require themselves to be combined, chimera-like, with
other statutes to achieve their effects; it is even rarer that one statute
should require another statute to be combined with an unspecified
third statute to do something. In fact, the phrase "solely pursuant" is
used in this way only once in the entire United States Code.57
Analytically, CALEA could mean one of three things. First, the
Pen Register Act may never authorize an order that would disclose
location information. Second, the Pen Register Act in combina-
el]tion with any other law may authorize such an order. Third, the
53 In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation &
Use of a Pen Register Device, a Trap & Trace Device, & for Geographic Location Info.
(McGiverin Opinion), 497 F. Supp. 2d 301, 304 (D.P.R. 2007) (quoting In re Application of
the United States for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site Info.
(Adelman Opinion), No. 06-MISC-004, 2006 WL 2871743, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 6, 2006)).
54 The Pen Register Act states that "no person may install or use a pen register or a
trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order under section 3123 of this title."
18 U.S.C. § 3121(a).
55 See, e.g., In re Application of the United States for an Order for Disclosure of
Telecomms. Records & Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace (Gorenstein
Opinion), 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 438-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that under Pen Register
Act, "the term 'signaling information' includes information on the location of cell site
towers used by a cellular telephone").
56 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) (2000). The provision states: "[W]ith regard to information
acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices...
call-identifying information shall not include any information that may disclose the phys-
ical location of the subscriber (except to the extent that the location may be determined
from the telephone number)." Id.
57 Gorenstein Opinion, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 442.
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Pen Register Act in combination with some laws (but not others) may
authorize such an order.
The first possibility, that no location tracking order may ever
issue pursuant to the Pen Register Act, is foreclosed by the text of
CALEA. Though "solely pursuant" is not a phrase that receives
much usage in the United States Code, the rule against surplusage
suggests that some statutory combination must authorize a location
tracking order.58 This alternative "requires reading the word 'solely'
out of the statute entirely. '59 If Congress intended to ban the use of
pen registers for location tracking, it simply could have said
"pursuant."
The second possibility, that CALEA simply requires any other
statute to be used in combination with the Pen Register Act, has a
certain sort of textual logic. After all, CALEA's only prohibition is
against issuing a certain type of order "solely" pursuant to the Pen
Register Act. If the request to the judge relies on any other authority
at all, then the order is not being issued "solely" pursuant to the Pen
Register Act, and CALEA isn't offended.
The other authority relied on, of course, would have to be ger-
mane to the information sought, and whatever process it imposed
would have to be followed. Otherwise CALEA's requirement would
be nonsense. How could one combine the Pen Register Act and the
tax code, for example? Once these constraints are admitted, though,
"any law at all in combination with the Pen Register Act" starts to
look more like "certain laws but not others." This is the third choice
for interpreting CALEA's prohibition, and has come to be known as
the "hybrid theory."'60
Even this third understanding, though the best alternative, is
strange. If another law is germane to the information sought, and its
procedural requirements are satisfied, then what "work" is the Pen
Register Act doing? Why not simply seek the order pursuant solely to
that other statute?
The likely answer is that cell phone tracking requires the use of a
pen register, and the Pen Register Act is the only procedural means
58 The rule against surplusage is a canon of statutory construction that discourages
interpretations of a statute that render some words meaningless. See, e.g., United States v.
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955).
59 In re Application of the United States for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Loca-
tion Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel. (Kaplan Opinion), 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 458 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
60 See In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation
& Use of a Pen Register Device, a Trap & Trace Device, & for Geographic Location Info.
(McGiverin Opinion), 497 F. Supp. 2d 301, 305 (D.P.R. 2007) (referring to theory by this
name).
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by which a court may approve the use of such a device. CALEA then
provides, awkwardly, that even if the requirements of the Pen Reg-
ister Act are satisfied, a pen register cannot be used to track physical
locations until the substantive requirements of another statute are
met. Why Congress would use this baffling method to express its
intent is unclear, especially given the collateral uncertainty it creates,
as I discuss below.
C. The Candidates for Statutory "Partners"
If some laws are permissible to combine with the Pen Register
Act and some are not, there must be a nonarbitrary way of figuring
out which are which. This question is a hard one to answer because
CALEA simply does not say. CALEA provides neither a list of laws
that may be acceptable statutory partners, nor any standards to pro-
vide guidance. Many possibilities have been proposed; each leads to
differing evidentiary burdens.
Law enforcement has proposed using the Stored Communica-
tions Act.6' This law is ordinarily used to access data stored on com-
puters. Some judges have instead suggested Rule 41 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure as a statutory partner.62 This is the gen-
eral authorization for magistrates to issue search warrants upon a
showing of probable cause. 63 Advocacy groups that join litigation as
amici have proposed that the only logical statutory partner for these
orders is Title 111.64
The Stored Communication Act (SCA) is a plausible, but
unlikely, partner to the Pen Register Act. As indicated by the chart
above, the evidentiary burden it imposes is intermediate, somewhere
between probable cause and an ordinary pen register. This is an odd
choice, however: The SCA, by its terms, applies only to stored elec-
tronic communications.65 Much cell phone tracking, however, is pro-
spective rather than backward-looking. 66 To avoid this problem, the
61 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2000).
62 See, e.g., In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use
of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info.
&/or Cell Site Info. (Orenstein Opinion I), 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 313-14 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
63 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1) (requiring judge to "issue the warrant" after receiving
affidavit from law enforcement officer "if there is probable cause to search for and seize a
person or property or to install and use a tracking device").
64 The Electronic Frontier Foundation is one example of such an advocacy group. See
Brief for the Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae Opposing the Government
at 6-9, In re Application for Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device with Cell Site Location
Auth., No. 05-1093 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2005) (arguing that only warrant satisfying Title
III's requirements can authorize cell phone tracking).
65 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
66 See supra text accompanying note 3.
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government often argues that before the cell site data is provided, it
has been stored for a few moments in the computers of the cell service
provider. 67 This reading has convinced some judges to issue the
orders,68 but stretches credulity very near to its breaking point.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, the general rule pro-
viding for a search warrant upon probable cause, 69 is unobjectionable
as a potential partner for the Pen Register Act. The government con-
cedes that probable cause is sufficient to track a cell phone; it simply
disagrees that it is necessary. While it is possible to argue that the
more rigorous requirements of Title III apply,70 the fact that the
statute deals only with content, not envelope, information suggests
that the requirements of Title III remain confined to traditional
wiretaps. 71
A textual analysis does reveal that some interpretations of the
Pen Register Act and CALEA are better than others. There is still
quite a bit of ambiguity remaining, however, and it is impossible to
reach a firm conclusion based on pure, "internal" statutory reasoning.
It is worth exploring alternative sources of meaning, particularly the
Constitution, to see if any progress can be made toward the best
understanding of this confusing patchwork of laws.
III
CONSTITUTIONAL DOUBT
This Part argues that the Constitution is a useful source of
meaning for this question. Considering the extent to which the Fourth
Amendment already regulates police investigations, it is logical to
expect it to bear on the statutory analysis of procedural requirements
for cell phone tracking. Indeed, the legal norms of that Amendment
ought to bear on one of the most significant investigative tools of the
new century. In particular, the Fourth Amendment can inform
67 The particular magistrate's tolerance for this form of wordplay often decides the
case. Cf. In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation
& Use of a Pen Register Device, a Trap & Trace Device, & for Geographic Location Info.
(McGiverin Opinion), 497 F. Supp. 2d 301, 309 n.3 (D.P.R. 2007) ("[T]he fact that there
may be momentary storage of cell site data before disclosure to the government does not
address the SCA's lack of procedural safeguards.").
68 See, e.g., In re Application of the United States for an Order for Disclosure of
Telecomms. Records & Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace (Gorenstein
Opinion), 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 446-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that cell site information
"is transmitted to the Government only after it has come into the possession of the cellular
telephone provider in the form of a record" and that SCA is appropriate statutory partner
with Pen Register Act under CALEA).
69 FED. R. GRIM. P. 41(d)(1).
70 See supra Part II.A and accompanying chart.
71 See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
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CALEA's ambiguous statutory text via the canon of "constitutional
doubt."
This Part will first explore what "constitutional doubt" or "consti-
tutional avoidance" is, as an interpretive technique, and how it oper-
ates. Second, it will explain why the issuance of cell phone tracking
orders without probable cause raises constitutional doubts. Finally,
this Part will argue that constitutional doubt is more than simply a
workable approach to this problem; it is positively required and
evinces respect for the statutory text without neglecting the task of
judging under a constitution. Much of the statutory law on this topic
was written in direct response to constitutional concerns and decisions
by the Supreme Court. In assessing the meaning of that statutory
framework for completely new investigative techniques, consulting
the Constitution is likely to yield a more organic understanding of all
the relevant law. Constitutional avoidance is thus the best approach
to this interpretive difficulty.
A. What Constitutional Doubt Is
Attempting to interpret statutes so that they are consistent with
the supreme law of the land is an exercise with a long pedigree across
boundaries of ideology and time. The canon has been invoked in
opinions by Justices Brandeis, 72 Brennan,73 Scalia,74 and Chief Justice
Marshall.75
Reduced to its essentials, the canon of constitutional avoidance
goes as follows: If a statute admits two constructions, one of which is
constitutionally uncontroversial and the other of which requires a
major decision on a hard question of constitutional law, the former is
better. Of course, sometimes a statute does not admit more than one
meaning, and the constitutional issue must be decided. But courts
have long assumed that "the legislature is loathe to come close... to
the precipice beyond which a statute will fall athwart of the
Constitution. "76
The canon does not require a conclusive determination that one
construction of a statute is definitely unconstitutional. It only requires
72 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-46 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
73 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 510 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 250 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75 Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). Avoidance of
conflict with the "law of nations" referred to in this passage has been later used by the
Court in constitutional avoidance cases. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
76 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STAT-
UTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 907 (4th ed. 2007).
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a serious controversy about one interpretation, such that it would be
impossible to avoid a major constitutional ruling were that interpreta-
tion embraced. Otherwise, as Justice Scalia has explained, the canon
would "mean that our duty is to first decide that a statute is unconsti-
tutional and then proceed to hold that such ruling was unnecessary
because the statute is susceptible of a meaning, which causes it not to
be repugnant to the Constitution. '77
The burden on someone who would oppose an argument based
on the constitutional avoidance canon is thus to do much more than
simply defend the constitutionality of their preferred interpretation.
Their burden is to demonstrate that their interpretation is so correct
as to be uncontroversial, raising no hard questions of constitutional
law at all.78
B. Constitutional Doubts in This Case
In this Section, I focus on the most serious source of constitu-
tional doubt for warrantless location tracking: the Fourth
Amendment. 79
The Fourth Amendment places significant limitations on police
investigation because of its blanket protection against "unreasonable
searches and seizures." 80 Despite this, constitutional law has not
played a part in the holding of any judge confronting applications for
cell phone tracking. One court dismissed the idea outright (and,
worse, relegated the dismissal to a footnote). 81 That dismissal was too
hasty; I argue in this Section that location tracking absent a showing of
probable cause does raise constitutional concerns serious enough to
justify the invocation of constitutional doubt as an interpretive
technique.
77 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States ex
rel. Att'y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
78 Cf. id. at 260 ("[A]Il that I need to establish.., is that on the basis of our jurispru-
dence to date, the answer to the constitutional question is not clear. It is the Court's
burden, on the other hand, to establish that its constitutional answer shines forth clearly
from our cases.").
79 In this Note, I focus on the Fourth Amendment in order to treat the issue in depth;
the reader should not infer from this that there could not be other serious constitutional
concerns. There is a colorable claim that cell phone tracking might restrict movement
between states, for example. Cf. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958) (describing
freedom of movement as "basic in our scheme of values"); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168,
180 (1868), overruled in part by United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533
(1944) (holding that Constitution ensures free egress and ingress between states).
80 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
81 In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of
Prospective Cell Site Info. (Adelman Opinion), No. 06-MISC-004, 2006 WL 2871743, at *5
n.6 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 6, 2006) (noting it is "doubtful that the government's use of cell site
information to track a suspect implicates the Fourth Amendment").
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The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches" by
the state or its agents of "persons, houses, papers, and effects. '82 This
means there are at least three constitutional inquiries necessary to
answer a Fourth Amendment question: First, is the activity a search at
all? Second, is it a search of "persons, houses, papers, [or] effects"?
Finally, is the search "unreasonable"?
There is precedent on each of these points, naturally, and the
remainder of this Part will consider it. It is worth noting, however,
that no Supreme Court case speaks directly to this issue for a simple
reason: The technique is new, enabled by a technology unforeseen in
1791 or even at the time of the Pen Register Act's drafting. The
assumption about investigation in 1791 was that for police to track
someone's movements, the police had to physically follow that person
around or hire spies to do the same. That assumption was first relaxed
when radio technology made police-installed "beepers" possible, but
even then the police needed advance physical access to an object guar-
anteed to be in the suspect's possession, as well as ongoing proximity
to the suspect.83 Today, the assumption has been completely obliter-
ated, so the failure of existing law to adequately resolve this novel
issue is unsurprising. Thus, this is an occasion to reexamine existing
precedent as much as to apply it, because the predicate assumptions of
the doctrine have changed. We cannot know what the ratifiers of the
Fourth Amendment would have thought their document meant for
remote location surveillance, but it is a safe bet that-if the possibility
of British soldiers monitoring Sam Adams' location from London was
feasible in their time-they would have thought it meant something.
1. Is This Police Activity a "Search"?
The threshold question for warrantless location tracking is
whether the constant monitoring of a citizen's every move, both in
public and elsewhere, is considered a search. I argue that it is.
The word "search" is not given its usual meaning84 when inter-
preting the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the Supreme Court has
crafted its own test for what a Fourth Amendment "search" is, a test
that has subsequently spawned its own forest of opinions. In Katz v.
United States,85 Justice Harlan's well-known concurrence read the
Fourth Amendment to extend only to "expectation[s] of privacy..
82 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
83 See infra Part III.B.l.iii (discussing Fourth Amendment beeper cases).
84 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 804 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "search" as "examina-
tion or scrutiny for the purpose of finding a person or thing").
85 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable. '86 Violating
those expectations is permissible, but constitutes a Fourth Amend-
ment "search."
This definition is more than a little circular, and has prompted
widespread criticism on this ground. The general tenor is captured by
Professor Amsterdam's argument that, if the test were taken seriously,
the state could eliminate all privacy interests by announcing "that we
were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic sur-
veillance. ' 87 Being told the Fourth Amendment protects the things
society regards as private does little more than unhelpfully reframe
the question.88 However, there are particular explications of "reason-
able expectations" that are relevant to cell phone tracking. These
explications are sufficient for our purposes, as they can guide applica-
tion of the Katz standard. The remainder of this Section considers
decisions about reasonable expectations of privacy in the context of
pen registers, disclosure of information to third parties, and beepers.
i. Pen Registers and Smith v. Maryland
The first major area of precedent bearing on cell phone tracking
is the Court's initial application of Katz to pen registers. In Smith v.
Maryland,8 9 the Supreme Court held that the use of pen registers was
not a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes, and so the Fourth
Amendment would not regulate their use.90 At first glance, this would
appear to settle the topic of this Note fairly decisively (and in the
opposite direction of its thesis), so it is worth analyzing the opinion in
greater depth.
It is a mistake to describe Smith too abstractly. In fact, all the
case decided was that for Fourth Amendment purposes, police gath-
ering of a list of dialed phone numbers was not a search. The differ-
ence between the pen registers at issue in Smith and the pen registers
at issue in this Note is that, while the name of the device remains the
same, the pen registers at issue in Smith did not disclose mobile
tracking information. They simply "record[ed] the numbers dialed
from the telephone at petitioner's home," and it was those dialed
86 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
87 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 384 (1974). Though beyond the scope of this Note, Professor Amsterdam's objection
seems irrefutable.
88 See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[Katz's
'reasonable expectations'] bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy
that this Court considers reasonable.").
89 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
90 Id. at 745-46.
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numbers that the petitioner sought to suppress. 91 The key to Justice
Blackmun's opinion is its determination that Smith lacked "a 'legiti-
mate expectation of privacy' regarding the numbers he dialed on his
phone.'"92
Thus, Smith does not place all conceivable uses of a pen register
outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment. 93 This is quite sen-
sible. A pen register is nothing more than a device or process. The
Fourth Amendment regulates searches, not the equipment or tech-
nology with which searches are conducted. That some uses of a pen
register raise Fourth Amendment concerns and others do not is unsur-
prising, just as some uses of a telescope might be regulated by the
Fourth Amendment even though others are not.
Beyond simply contrasting the holding of Smith with the current
facts, however, consider too that Justice Blackmun's analysis is
animated by concerns inapplicable to mobile location tracking.
Justice Blackmun noted that everyone knows "that the phone com-
pany has facilities for making permanent records of the numbers they
dial, for they see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls on their
monthly bills."' 94 The typical cell phone bill, however, does not con-
tain the triangulated latitude and longitude information the police can
calculate using today's pen registers, for a simple reason: Phone bills
disclose only information about calls, whereas cell phones are in con-
stant communication with radio towers whether or not a call is being
made.
An advocate of extending Smith to this new type of pen register
might analogize to Internet surveillance. Most commentators have
generally assumed that Smith's reasoning holds when applied to infor-
mation like e-mail addresses, and thus reading such information is not
a Fourth Amendment search. 95 In United States v. Forrester,96 the
Ninth Circuit became the first appeals court to explicitly so hold. 97
This thinking keys off of the familiar "content/envelope" 98 distinction:
91 Id. at 737.
92 Id. at 742, 745-46 (emphasis added).
93 See id. at 745-46 ("We therefore conclude that petitioner in all probability enter-
tained no actual expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, and that, even if
he did, his expectation was not 'legitimate.' The installation and use of a pen register,
consequently, was not a 'search,' and no warrant was required.").
94 Id. at 742.
95 See, e.g., Orin Kerr, No Fourth Amendment Protection in E-mail Addresses, IP
Addresses, Ninth Circuit Holds, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, http://www.volokh.com/posts/
chain_1184933802.shtml (July 6, 2007, 18:27 EST). It is also generally agreed that the con-
tent of those messages is protected except upon procurement of a Title III order. Id.
96 495 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).
97 Id. at 1048-50.
98 See supra Part II.A.
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The e-mail address on a message is like the postal address on a letter,
which is like the phone number dialed to place a call, and so on.
Recall, though, that pen registers used to monitor one's location
do not fit neatly into the "content/envelope" paradigm. Even if the
cell site data is "envelope" information in a strict technical sense, for
Fourth Amendment purposes, it is undeniably more intrusive than
having the e-mail addresses of one's correspondence logged. It also
violates one's "reasonable expectations of privacy" far more, to the
extent that phrase is meaningful. The "content/envelope" distinction
is often a helpful heuristic when determining Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness, but it is no more than that.
What Smith settles is the question of a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" in dialed phone numbers, and perhaps analogous envelope
information. But it is no help at all in assessing such an expectation in
the location of one's phone (and, by extension, one's self).
"Envelope" information or no, rote application of Smith would fail to
capture its motivating principles.
ii. The Third-Party Doctrine
The third-party doctrine is the principle that "a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns
over to third parties." 99 Another potential justification of warrantless
mobile location tracking might go: The user of the phone voluntarily
conveys his location to the phone company, ergo he enjoys no expec-
tation of privacy in that information, ergo the Fourth Amendment is
not implicated.
This is a strong argument, if one takes the third-party doctrine as
seriously as it could possibly be taken. This is a useful occasion to
consider the boundaries of the third-party doctrine: What does volun-
tarily conveying information really mean?
The third-party doctrine has grown over the course of many
cases.100 In United States v. Miller, for example, the Court held that a
bank depositor has no "legitimate 'expectation of privacy"' in finan-
cial information "voluntarily conveyed to ... banks and exposed to
99 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44.
100 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (holding that informa-
tion voluntarily given to banks is not protected by Fourth Amendment); Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973) (holding that information knowingly given to
accountant is not constitutionally protected); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752
(1971) (holding that conversations voluntarily transmitted by one party to police are not
constitutionally protected); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302-03 (1966) (holding
that conversation recounted to police by government informant is not constitutionally pro-
tected); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438 (1963) (holding that conversations volun-
tarily recounted by one party to police are not constitutionally protected).
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their employees in the ordinary course of business."101 Explaining
why, the Court noted:
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that
the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does
not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party
and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the infor-
mation is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not
be betrayed.102
Because the depositor "assumed the risk" of disclosure, the Court
held that it would be unreasonable for him to expect his financial
records to remain private.
The strongest possible formulation of the third-party doctrine,
though, cannot be correct. A person also voluntarily transmits the
contents of his communication to the phone companies, and yet it is
widely recognized that listening in on phone conversations is a
search.10 3 However, this point has been made unsuccessfully before:
The telephone conversation itself must be electronically transmitted
by telephone company equipment, and may be recorded or over-
heard by the use of other company equipment. Yet we have
squarely held that the user of even a public telephone is entitled "to
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world."104
The boundaries of this doctrine are thus far from clear. Trans-
mitting some information to a third party will result in the police
being able to seize that information without implicating the Fourth
Amendment, but not other information, without a clear mechanism to
distinguish which is which. What result, when applied to cell phone
tracking?
In the spirit of constitutional doubt and avoiding major constitu-
tional issues when possible, there is a way out. A court could and
should hold that because a cell phone passively communicates its loca-
tion to the radio towers without user input, the third-party doctrine is
101 425 U.S. at 442.
102 Id. at 443 (citation omitted).
103 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 746-47 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that wiretapping public phone is
Fourth Amendment search) ("The telephone conversation itself must be electronically
transmitted... and may be recorded or overheard .... Yet we have squarely held that the
user of even a public telephone is entitled 'to assume that the words he utters into the
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.'" (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 352)).
104 Smith, 442 U.S. at 746-47 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at
352).
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not implicated. If the phone is transmitting its location at all times no
matter what its owner does, it can hardly be said that the user has
voluntarily conveyed some information to the phone company; rather,
it is the phone doing the conveyance, without the user doing anything
at all.
A dedicated believer in the third-party doctrine might find this
explanation unsatisfying. But it is the only way to deal with the issue
coherently and also avoid a difficult constitutional decision harmo-
nizing Katz and Miller.
iii. The "Beeper" Cases: Knotts and Karo
The Supreme Court, in the early 1980s, confronted a primitive
form of the technology being used today: police tracking of suspects
using "beepers." In United States v. Knotts10 5 and United States v.
Karo,10 6 the Court held that the installation of the beeper and subse-
quent tracking of the container into which it was installed was not a
search for Fourth Amendment purposes, so long as the vehicle was
monitored only on public roads and in public places. 10 7
Even stated at that level of generality, the combined holdings of
Knotts and Karo argue that a warrant might be required to track a cell
phone. Cell phones, after all, do not stay only on public roads or in
public places. A cell phone generally stays in the pocket of its owner
throughout the day, accompanying her to her private office, the
homes of those she may visit, and around her own abode, perhaps
even to "her daily sauna and bath. ' 108 All of this suggests that
obtaining location information using cell phones is a search.
Even location tracking while the phones remain in public is more
problematic than a very general reading of Knotts and Karo might
suggest. Unlike a cell phone, a beeper does not disclose specific loca-
tion information, just relative distance. As Chief Judge Legg has
explained, beepers "merely help the police stay in contact with the
vehicle that they are actively 'tailing."' 0 9 Use of cell phone tracking,
105 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
106 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
107 In Knotts, the Court held that it was not a search to use a beeper since it revealed
only information that someone could observe from the public. "[H]e voluntarily conveyed
to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a
particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination
when he exited from public roads onto private property." 460 U.S. at 281-82. In Karo,
when the beeper was used to track items on private property that police could not have
observed from outside the house, the Court held that it was a Fourth Amendment search.
468 U.S. at 715.
108 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001) (discussing intimate details that can be
revealed by certain intrusive searches).
109 United States v. Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d 366, 368 (D. Md. 2004).
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"unlike a beeper, is a substitute for police surveillance." 110 It is
doubtful indeed that tracking a cell phone-a highly precise, real-time
substitute for police surveillance-would or should receive constitu-
tional treatment as lenient as a beeper, a highly imprecise aid to ordi-
nary visual surveillance. Knotts and Karo are among the strongest
arguments that cell phone location tracking is a search.
iv. Synthesis
The threshold question of "is this a search?" turns out to be quite
complex, because cell phone tracking sits at the intersection of the pen
register decisions, the third-party doctrine, and the beeper cases. A
cell phone tracking order is a super-pen register that installs a perma-
nent super-beeper. The third-party doctrine provides the most sup-
port for the conclusion that gathering this information is not a search,
but recall that this Note is advocating only a strategy of constitutional
avoidance. The presence of strong counterarguments on the constitu-
tional merits is actually an excellent reason to avoid a decision that
would require engaging in those constitutional debates.
2. Is This a Search of "Persons, Papers, Houses [or] Effects"?
The Fourth Amendment does not regulate all searches. By its
own terms, it applies only to searches of "people, papers, houses, and
effects." ' The second question in a Fourth Amendment analysis of
cell phone tracking is: Does such tracking achieve a search of any-
thing on that list?
A literalist argument is that the tracking of the phone only
searches the location of that phone. This is true, but there is no
reason to embrace a failure of imagination so often rejected in other
contexts. For example, the use of thermal imaging devices to monitor
the external walls of a house "searches," in a literal sense, only the
exterior surface of the walls. Justice Stevens, in his Kyllo dissent,
makes exactly this point: "All that the infrared camera did in this case
was passively measure heat emitted from the exterior surfaces of peti-
tioner's home; all that those measurements showed were relative dif-
ferences in emission levels, vaguely indicating that some areas of the
roof and outside walls were warmer than others. 11 2 One can imagine
the parallel argument being made for cell phone tracking.
110 Id. Chief Judge Legg was discussing GPS sensors placed on a car, but the underlying
issues are the same.
111 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
112 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 42-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Kyllo, however, makes it clear
that what a search "reveals," not what it literally monitors, is the rele-
vant standard: "The dissent's repeated assertion that the thermal
imaging did not obtain information regarding the interior of the home
is simply inaccurate. A thermal imager reveals the relative heat of
various rooms in the home." 1 3
A thermal imager measures only the external temperature of the
walls, much as cell phone tracking measures only the location of a
phone. But what the technology in both cases reveals is private infor-
mation about an item on the Fourth Amendment's list of regulated
subjects. In Kyllo, it was the home; with cell phone tracking, it is the
person. In fact, when a person is at home, location tracking of that
person's cell phone achieves both a search of her home (by revealing
that there is a person inside) and her person (by revealing her loca-
tion). If one wanted to fight literalism with more of the same, it is also
logically true that tracking a cell phone's location achieves a search of
any container in which the phone resides: perhaps a jacket pocket, a
briefcase, or some other container, which the police ordinarily must
get a warrant to search. 14
While it is true that the same information could be gained with a
round-the-clock stakeout of the subject's front door, consider Justice
Scalia's response to this argument:
The fact that equivalent information could sometimes be obtained
by other means does not make lawful the use of means that violate
the Fourth Amendment. The police might, for example, learn how
many people are in a particular house by setting up year-round sur-
veillance; but that does not make breaking and entering to find out
the same information lawful.1 15
A bit of common sense will dispel any doubt that cell phone
tracking is designed to search for a person and reveal her location. If
that were not the point, such searches would be of little value to
police. It is precisely because of the powerful intuition that a person
tends to have her phone with her that this evidence is useful in police
investigations and criminal trials.
3. Is This Search "Unreasonable"?
The final stage of Fourth Amendment inquiry is reasonableness.
There can be no constitutional doubts about reasonable searches; the
113 Id. at 35 n.2 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
114 Cf United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (holding that search warrant is
required to search footlocker even if police have probable cause to believe that it contains
contraband).
115 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35 n.2.
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Fourth Amendment provides no freedom from them. It would cer-
tainly be reasonable to monitor a person's location if one had a war-
rant founded on probable cause. 116 So the key question is: Is cell
phone tracking a reasonable search even when done absent a war-
rant? In this case, the question is not really a close one.
Much as with the meaning of "search," the word "unreasonable"
in the Fourth Amendment context has acquired a thick judicial gloss.
There are generally two moves made when arguing about the reasona-
bleness of a search: invocation of the presumption of unreasonable-
ness for warrantless searches, followed by invocation of one of the
laundry-list exceptions to this presumption.
First, the Supreme Court has stated many times that warrantless
searches are presumptively unreasonable. "[S]earches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magis-
trate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions."117 The Supreme Court has referred to this as "a cardinal prin-
ciple" of Fourth Amendment law. 118
The Court has also established a raft of exceptions to this pre-
sumption, often invoked by those who wish to search without a war-
rant. This has been done over the vocal and persistent objections of
some Justices, who would either prefer that the warrant presumption
be truly categorical or be abandoned altogether in favor of a "reason-
ableness" inquiry grounded in historical practice.119
Despite the presence of this lively debate in the pages of the U.S.
Reports, it is actually not particularly important for cell phone
tracking. The established exceptions to the warrant requirement-
such as arrests in public, 120 stop-and-frisk searches, 12' searches inci-
dent to arrest,12 2 and so on-do not apply to cell phone tracking.
Potentially, of course, the warrant requirement could be excused by
116 Doubters of this proposition should recall that, with a warrant, the police can do far
more intrusive things than simply monitor a person's location. For example, with a war-
rant, the police could strip search a child. Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2004)
(suggesting in dicta that search warrant could authorize said search).
117 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted).
118 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).
119 The most vocal critic of the current approach is Justice Scalia. According to him, the
Court has "lurched back and forth between imposing a categorical warrant requirement
and looking to reasonableness alone." California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring). The result is that the warrant requirement has become "so riddled
with exceptions that it [is] basically unrecognizable." Id.
120 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976).
121 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
122 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
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exigency, as it always can.123 There is no worry that a burdensome
warrant process will slow down the police in a true emergency that
requires a cell phone to be tracked without any delay. But other than
that, probably none of the exceptions to the warrant requirement are
relevant to cell phone tracking. 124 The real question is the definition
of "search."
4. Synthesis of the Constitutional Doubts
This Part has attempted to break the tie amongst the various pos-
sible procedural requirements for cell phone tracking, by testing
whether such tracking would be constitutional absent probable cause.
The most likely answer, certainly likely enough to raise major consti-
tutional doubts about alternative statutory interpretations, is no.
Thus, the proper statutory partner with the Pen Register Act under
CALEA is Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, which enshrines
the Fourth Amendment's probable cause and warrant require-
ments.1 25
The tracking of a cell phone is very likely a Fourth Amendment
search. The "beeper" cases establish a strong foundation for a reason-
able expectation of privacy in one's movements, at least when one is
not in public places. Moreover, the third-party cases are inapposite,
since it is the cell phone itself that passively transmits location at all
times without interference from the user. This search is a search of
the person and potentially the home, and without a warrant, such a
search is unreasonable and thus unlawful.
There is room to argue, of course, against all of the points just
made. But the job of a court in the interpretation of statutes is to
avoid hard constitutional questions. Once it is clear that only one
interpretation of the statutes is constitutionally uncontroversial, courts
are duty bound to embrace that interpretation.
123 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) ("The Fourth Amendment does
not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would
gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.").
124 Of course, it is always possible that a court might decide to engage in Fourth
Amendment "reasonableness" analysis and forgo the use of its ordinary presumption of
unreasonableness. Cf Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-27 (applying "reasonableness" analysis to
uphold warrantless stop-and-frisk searches). However, the "reasonableness" inquiry
would itself be a major and novel question of constitutional law-exactly the sort of thing
the canon of constitutional doubt counsels against except when unavoidable. Thus, the
outcome of a free-floating, no-presumptions inquiry into the reasonableness of cell phone
tracking is beyond the scope of this Note; it's only necessary that the reader believe such
an inquiry would constitute a major question of constitutional law.
125 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1); see also supra note 64 and accompanying text
(describing contents and requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41).
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As a result, the best reading of the electronic surveillance statutes
is one that requires that CALEA be "combined with" Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41, the rule providing for a warrant upon showing
of probable cause, if a cell phone's location is to be tracked. This is
the best reading because it is the only one that doesn't raise hard con-
stitutional questions. Once probable cause is shown and a warrant
issued, there is no longer any doubt about the constitutionality of the
search.
C. Why Avoidance Is the Answer
Despite the attractiveness of constitutional doubt as an interpre-
tive tool in this case, none of the courts to address warrantless location
tracking have relied on it to decide the case. 126 Moreover, though this
topic has attracted attention in the scholarly literature, scholars have
not explored this dimension either.127 The two bodies of published
opinion tend to head down completely different paths: The judges
mostly interpret statutes, and the law review articles mostly go straight
to the Constitution. This Section argues that constitutional avoidance
is more than just a novel approach to this problem; rather, it is the
best one.
It must, of course, be honestly admitted that the canon has promi-
nent detractors. Judge Posner has argued that it is a "judge-made
'penumbra' that unnecessarily sharpens the tensions between the
legislative and judicial branches and breeds judicial activism. 128 No
less a voice than Judge Friendly conceded that while "questioning the
doctrine . . . is rather like challenging Holy Writ," constitutional
avoidance has "almost as many dangers as advantages. ' 129
More recently, Frederick Schauer has argued that "it is by no
means clear that a strained interpretation of a federal statute that
avoids a constitutional question is any less a judicial intrusion than the
judicial invalidation on constitutional grounds of a less strained inter-
126 Though the Smith Opinion mentions the issue in passing, it is not essential to the
holding. In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing (1) Installation &
Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device or Process, (2) Access to Customer Records,
& (3) Cell Phone Tracking (Smith Opinion), 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 836-37 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
127 See, e.g., Kevin McLaughlin, Note, The Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Location
Tracking: Where Are We?, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & Er. L.J. 421 (2007) (arguing for a
major decision of constitutional law without mentioning avoidance doctrine).
128 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 285 (1985).
129 Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in
BENCHMARKS 196, 211 (1967).
Reprinted With The Permission of New York University School of Law
October 20081
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
pretation of the same statute. 1 30 Though this is surely true, Professor
Schauer's criticism is presumably satisfied by interpretations that are
not "strained." Justice Kennedy has similarly urged caution, arguing
that the canon "should not be given too broad a scope lest a whole
new range of Government action be proscribed by interpretive
shadows cast by constitutional provisions that might or might not
invalidate it.' '131
These critiques are all valid, and Justice Kennedy's point in par-
ticular ought not to be taken lightly: Applied in bad faith, avoidance
has substantial potential for mischief. The canon, however, also
figures prominently in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, 132 and
given how much of criminal procedure is constitutionalized, the tech-
nique is quite relevant in this particular area.
One might ask: Why not go all the way? If these searches are so
constitutionally doubtful, why not have the magistrate judges simply
declare them unconstitutional and be done with it? What does the
avoidance doctrine bring to the table? And aren't there, as Justice
Frankfurter once conceded, "obvious advantages in knowing at once
the legal powers of the government"? 133 Yes. However, unnecessary
declarations of unconstitutionality are at odds with long American tra-
dition. Before Marbury v. Madison134 was decided, Justice Chase
declared of the power to strike down statutes as unconstitutional: "I
will never exercise it, but in a very clear case. ' 135 Avoiding the exer-
cise of this power is more than mere prudence; it is a rule that has "so
long been applied by [the] Court that it is beyond debate. '136
To "avoid, not seek out, a constitutional issue" is to recognize the
essential nature of our separated powers. 137 "[A] just respect for the
legislature requires, that the obligation of its laws should not be
unnecessarily and wantonly assailed. ' 138 Whatever one may think of
a particular Congress, it is hard to dispute that the institution has a
substantially better claim on "cherished principles of representation
130 Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup. Cr. REV. 71, 74. For a general
discussion of avoidance's place in textualism generally, see John F. Manning, Textualism
and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 119-26 (2001).
131 Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 481 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
132 See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001) (invoking constitutional avoid-
ance doctrine).
133 United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 124 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
134 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
135 Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796).
136 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
137 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
138 Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (opinion by Marshall, C.J.).
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and political equality" than does any judicial body. 139 It might thus be
wise to exercise some modicum of caution before laying waste to con-
gressional enactments under the banner of the Fourth Amendment, so
long as there are other options available that do not compromise the
values for which we hold the banner aloft.
Neither, though, should we shy away from insisting that our con-
stitutional values may be on the line. While confining the reasoning
purely to the text of the statutes has the virtue of modesty, it does a
disservice to the citizenry. We have long come to expect more vig-
orous supervision of criminal procedure from the courts.'40 As tech-
nological advancement gives the police previously unimaginable tools,
ours is neither a time to be gun-shy nor trigger-happy.
CONCLUSION
As a general matter, remote location tracking raises issues of
what might be termed "location privacy." This term does not appear
in the Constitution or in any statute, but is a helpful conceptual lens
through which to think about issues related to the narrow one dis-
cussed here. The "right to be let alone" 141 does not mean much if,
thanks to the vicarious presence of the state in one's phone, solitude is
an illusion.
Location tracking by the government, however, is only the begin-
ning. Location-aware devices are increasingly demanded by con-
sumers themselves: Some new phones can disclose teenagers' location
to their parents142 or alert users when their friends are nearby1 43
Low-cost, widely available location surveillance promises many inter-
esting questions for the law, in the context of police investigation and
elsewhere.
A robust public debate about location privacy is essential for
good policy. That discussion should not occur without reference to
shared constitutional norms about search; and in the reading of stat-
utes, Congress should not be presumed ignorant of them.
Remote location tracking of criminal suspects is an investigative
tool that could not have been imagined when the Fourth Amendment
139 Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346,
1353 (2006).
140 E.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *255-77 (examining criminal proce-
dure in chapter entitled "Of Courts of a Criminal Jurisdiction").
141 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 7, at 193.
142 David Pogue, Cellphones That Track the Kids, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2006, at C1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2O06/12/21/technology/21pogue.html.
143 Ryan Kim, Find Friends by Cell Phone, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 14, 2006, at C1, available
at http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/cla/2006/11/14/BUGMMMC1KE1.DTL.
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was written. Nor could it have been imagined when the Pen Register
Act was written nearly two centuries later. The doubtful constitution-
ality of engaging in such tracking without a warrant compels reading
the electronic surveillance statutes to require one.
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